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Abstract
This survey presents the most relevant neural network models of autism spec-
trum disorder and schizophrenia, from the first connectionist models to recent
deep network architectures. We analyzed and compared the most representa-
tive symptoms with its neural model counterpart, detailing the alteration intro-
duced in the network that generates each of the symptoms, and identifying their
strengths and weaknesses. For completeness we additionally cross-compared
Bayesian and free-energy approaches. Models of schizophrenia mainly focused
on hallucinations and delusional thoughts using neural disconnections or in-
hibitory imbalance as the predominating alteration. Models of autism rather
focused on perceptual difficulties, mainly excessive attention to environment de-
tails, implemented as excessive inhibitory connections or increased sensory pre-
cision. We found an excessive tight view of the psychopathologies around one
specific and simplified effect, usually constrained to the technical idiosyncrasy
of the network used. Recent theories and evidence on sensorimotor integration
and body perception combined with modern neural network architectures offer
a broader and novel spectrum to approach these psychopathologies, outlining
the future research on neural networks computational psychiatry, a powerful
asset for understanding the inner processes of the human brain.
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1. Introduction
In the world, there is a prevalence of schizophrenia (SZ) that ranges between
four and seven per 1000 individuals (between three and five million people) [1]
and a prevalence of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) that ranges between six
and 16 per 1000 children (between 1 of 150 and 1 of 59 children) [2]. SZ and
ASD have in common that they both cause deficits in social interaction and
are characterized by perceptual peculiarities. While ASD has its onset in early
childhood, SZ is typically diagnosed in adults, although in very rare cases, ap-
pears during development [3]. Similar neural bases have been observed for both
disorders [4], which has even led to the suggestion that some SZ cases might be
part of the autism spectrum [5]. In fact, there are similarities such that both
pathologies show atypical sensorimotor integration and perceptual interpreta-
tion. However, there are also striking differences between these disorders. A
common symptom of SZ is the occurrence of hallucinations or delusions, in con-
trast to ASD which is characterized by atypical non-verbal communication and
emotional reciprocity. Furthermore, a few savant syndrome cases were reported
in ASD individuals with extraordinary skills like painting [6]. Fig. 1 depicts,
in an artistic way, the reality perceived by two individuals in the spectrum of
these disorders.
(a) (b)
Fig. 1: Artistic pieces representing different perceptions of the world. (a) Hunted, c©2019
Henry Cockburn, a SZ diagnosed artist. (b) Drawing by Nadia Chomyn at the age of 5, a
gifted ASD diagnosed child, reprinted from [7], c©2012 Lorna Selfe.
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For both disorders, neurological, genetic and environmental causes have been
suggested, but to date the causes and underlying cognitive processes remain un-
clear. A major challenge in diagnosis is their heterogeneity and non-specificity.
Heterogeneity means that symptoms, prognosis and treatment responses vary
significantly between different subjects. Non-specificity expresses that a single
biological basis can result in different phenotypes (multifinality) and different
biological bases can result in a single phenotype (equifinality). Non-specificity,
as a biological abnormality related to a psychiatric disorder, can be found in
many other neurological disorders [8, 9].
Computational modeling of psychopathologies or Computational Psychiatry
is one of the potential key players [10, 11, 9] to tackle heterogeneity and non-
specificity, and to better understand the cognitive processes underlying these
disorders. Eventually, computational models might help to validate theoretical
models, generate new hypothesis or even suggest new treatments. There are
different levels of descriptions or units of analysis to study these disorders, which
encompass from genes to molecules, to cells, to circuits, to physiology, and then
to behaviour. “Computational Psychiatry provides some of the tools to link
these levels” [12].
In particular, neural network models serve, due to their analogy to biological
neurons, as a tool to test and generate hypotheses on possible neurological causes
[13]. Artificial neural networks cannot only be useful from the data-driven point
of view (e.g., fitting a model to fMRI data), but can also be used as a simplified
model of the human brain to replicate human behavior and to investigate which
modifications in the connectionist models cause which alterations of behavior.
1.1. Artificial neural network modeling of psychopathologies
Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs or NNs) were first introduced in the 1950’s
as an attempt to provide a computational model of the inner processes of the
human brain [14]. Nevertheless, their potential was not fully unraveled until
the last decades because of limited computational power and data shortage [15].
Due to the inspiration from biological processes of our brain and their connec-
tionist nature, these technologies have also opened a door to new research fields
that combine disciplines, such as neuroscience and psychology with artificial
intelligence and robotics. Within the field of cognitive neuroscience, neural net-
works are already a tool for getting insights into the complex structures of our
brain and gaining a better understanding of how learning, memory or visual
perception might work on a neural level [16, 17].
In the late 80’s and early 90’s, neural networks were used for the first time
related to psychiatry, trying to imitate psychological disorders [18, 19]. Early
efforts in compiling ANN models for cognitive disorders can be found in [20]
and in [21], specifically for autism. Due to immense advances in computational
power, 20 years later, computational modeling using ANN and deep learning
is becoming a powerful asset to aid the investigation of these disorders. The
challenge is to coherently translate the findings in different levels of description
into a mathematical connectionist model.
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A significant advantages of using ANN models is that they can deal with
a vast amount of information and they can learn and predict complex non-
linear patterns. The structure of ANNs makes also possible to systematically
test which parameter modifications cause effects similar to the symptoms of
psychiatric disorders. Furthermore, these ANN models and their alterations
may be directly implemented in artificial agents (e.g. robots) filling the last
level: comparing the behavior of such agents with behavior observed in patients
[22, 23]. In this way, existing hypotheses from neuroscience and psychology
could be tested, and new hypotheses on potential causes could be formulated.
1.2. Purpose and content overview
This historical review aims at serving as a reference for computational neuro-
science, robotics, psychology and psychiatry researchers interested in modeling
psychopathologies with neural networks. This work extends general computa-
tional modeling reviews [20, 21, 24, 25, 26] by focusing on neural network models
for SZ and ASD with detailed explanation of the alterations on a neural level
and their associated symptoms, including their technical architectures as well as
their mathematical formulation. For completeness, we also included Bayesian
and predictive processing models due to their similarities to ANNs and their
relevance inside the neuroscience community. Actually, we show that, concep-
tually, ANN and Bayesian models are taking similar approaches to model these
conditions.
We start in Section 2 with a short introduction of the mentioned disorders,
listing their main characteristics and symptoms mainly based on the latest Di-
agnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) descriptions.
For readability and due to the heterogeneity of the reviewed methods, in
Section 3, we first summarize and discuss the main modeling approaches and
hypotheses which are referenced in literature. Afterwards, Section 4 and Sec-
tion 5 present a comprehensive review of models of SZ and ASD, respectively,
organized by the type of modeling approach. To help the reader, we summa-
rized the content of Section 4 and Section 5 into two tables: Tab. 1 for SZ and
Tab. 2 for ASD. Finally, in Section 6 some hints about future research on ANN
for computational psychiatry particularly for ASD and SZ are described.
2. Pathologies and their symptoms
SZ and ASD are disorders that change the way we perceive and act in the
world. Atypicalities in perception and in cognitive processing cause difficulties
in connecting with the world, in particular for social interaction. Since the first
reports of autistic symptoms [27], both conditions have been closely related, as
subjects with ASD were often previously incorrectly diagnosed as schizophrenic.
Nowadays, these two pathologies remain still strongly connected as both are as-
sociated with atypicalities in sensory processing and integration of information,
and due to their strong heritability [28].
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2.1. Schizophrenia
SZ is a serious psychiatric disorder that affects a person’s feelings, social
behavior and perception of reality. Its biological causes are still unknown, but
genetic and environmental factors, i.e. prenatal stress, traumatic experiences or
drug use, can be key factors for the development of this disorder. Its symptoms
are usually divided into positive symptoms and negative symptoms [29]. Positive
symptoms generally correspond to increased function, including hallucinations
and delusions. Negative symptoms, corresponding to decreased function, are a
lack of the normal function such as diminished emotional expression. Positive
symptoms are more apparent, but generally respond better to medication. Neg-
ative symptoms are more subtle and less responsive to pharmacological treat-
ment. Below some of the most characteristic symptoms of SZ taken from the
DSM-5 [30] are listed.
Positive symptoms:
1. Delusions: have convinced beliefs that are not real, and cannot be changed
despite clear evidence
2. Hallucinations: perceive things that do not exist as real, without an ex-
ternal stimulus
3. Disorganized thinking : difficulty to keep track of thoughts, drift between
unrelated ideas during speech
4. Disorganized or abnormal movements: difficulties to perform goal-directed
tasks, catatonic (stopping movement in unconventional posture) or stereo-
typed (repetitive) movements
Negative symptoms
1. Diminished emotional expression: reduced expression of emotions through
speech, facial expressions or movements
2. Avolition: lack of interests, inaction
3. Alogia: diminished speech output
4. Anhedonia: diminished ability to experience pleasure
5. Asociality : lack of interest in social interaction
Multiple reports have also associated self-other disturbances to SZ. This
means that schizophrenic patients can perceive own and external actions or
feelings, but may have problems differentiating them. This could be part of the
explanation for auditory hallucinations and struggles during social interaction.
Van der Weiden et al. published an extensive review [31] on possible causes for
this disorder. Finally, in more severe cases, motor disorders have been reported
[32], such as stereotypical and catatonic behavior.
SZ is investigated by many researchers because of its prevalence and its dev-
astating effects on patients, which can have life-changing consequences on the
patient’s relationships and social situation. Moreover, its close relation with the
inner workings of self-perception and self-other distinction, raises multiple re-
searcher’s interest from areas such as psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science
and even developmental robotics.
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2.2. Autism spectrum disorder
ASD is a prevalent developmental disorder that has a behavior-based diag-
nosis due to its still unclear biological causes. It was first introduced in the
1940s by Kanner [27], who presented the cases of eleven children “whose condi-
tion [differed] so markedly and uniquely from anything reported so far”, some
of them being previously diagnosed as schizophrenic. Actually, the term autis-
tic was originally used for describing symptoms in schizophrenic patients. This
kind of disorder mainly affects individual’s social interaction, communication,
interests and motor abilities. It is often referred to as a heterogeneous group
of disorders, as individuals show very distinct combinations of symptoms with
different severity. Nevertheless, there are some characteristic attributes that are
commonly associated with ASD, which we have listed from the DSM-5 [30].
Deficits in social communication and interaction:
1. Impairment in socio-emotional reciprocity : struggle to share common in-
terests and emotions, reduced response or interest in social interaction
2. Deficits in non-verbal communication: problems integrating verbal and
nonverbal communication, and using and understanding gestures or facial
expressions
3. Problems to maintain relationships: problems or absence of interest in
understanding relationships and adjusting behavior
Abnormal behavior patterns, interests or activities:
1. Stereotyped movements or behavior : repetitive motor movements or speech
2. Attention to sameness: adherence to routines, distress because of small
changes
3. Fixated and restricted interests: strong attachment to certain objects,
activities or topics
4. Hyper- or hyporeactivity to sensory input : indifference to pain, repulsive
response to certain sounds or textures, visual fascination
Early identification of individuals with ASD has focused on non-verbal com-
munication interaction, mainly observing attention and gaze behaviours us-
ing standardized tests, such as the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule
(ADOS) [33].
ASD is thought to be caused by genetic disorders and environmental fac-
tors and evidence points at high heritability [28]. Furthermore, recent studies,
using a computer model of the human fetus, have also highlighted the impor-
tance of intrauterine embodied interaction on the development of the human
brain and in particular cortical representation of body parts [34]. Some authors
have suggested that preterm infants might have a higher risk of enduring such
developmental disorders.
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3. Modeling approaches and hypotheses
ASD and SZ are among the psychiatric disorders which are most commonly
investigated using computational modeling. A reason might be the unclear un-
derlying cognitive mechanisms of these disorders which computational models
might help to unravel. The studies we discuss in this review often take similar
approaches for modeling ASD and SZ. In fact, these two disorders share certain
symptoms, such as deficits in social communication and motor impairments
manifesting as decreased response or repetitive and stereotyped movements.
However, core symptoms of SZ (delusions and hallucinations) are not associ-
ated with ASD. Also perceptual atypicalities in both disorders differ in that SZ
involves perceptual experiences that occur without an external stimulus whereas
ASD is more typically characterized by hypersensitivity to certain stimuli from
the environment.
Similarities between computational models of ASD and SZ, therefore, are
not so much motivated by similarities in symptoms. Actually, studies modeling
SZ focused mainly on delusions and hallucinations which are not predominant
in ASD. Similarities instead can be found in the suggested biological causes.
Accordingly, similar parameter modifications are investigated in computational
models.
There are three main biological causes that are commonly employed in com-
putational models: neural dysconnections1, imbalance of excitation and inhibi-
tion, and alterations of the precision of predictions or sensory information.
3.1. Dysconnection hypotheses
Especially for SZ, one of the most discussed theories is functional discon-
nections [35, 36]. The main motivation is that SZ cannot be explained by an
impairment of a single brain region, but only by a (decreased) interaction be-
tween multiple brain regions [35]. Disconnections or underconnectivity are also
discussed as a potentional cause of ASD [37, 38, 39], but more recent evidence
also points at increased connectivity [40, 41] or a distortion of patterns of func-
tional connectivity [42].
In the discussed studies for SZ, dysconnection is primarily implemented by
an increased pruning of synapses [43, 44, 45]. Such a pruning is a normal de-
velopmental process between adolescence and early adulthood [46]. Computa-
tional models demonstrate using Hopfield networks [43] or feed-forward networks
[44, 45] that too strong pruning can cause fragmented recall or the recall of new
patterns, which can be related to the symptom of hallucinations in SZ.
Notably, the SZ symptoms replicated with connection pruning focus solely
on hallucinations or delusions and might not be appropriate for modelling ASD.
In fact, in a biological context, it might be more appropriate to disturb connec-
tions between neurons instead of simply cutting them. This idea was followed
1Note that disconnection usually refers to a lack of connection whereas dysconnection
describes atypical connectivity which might include decreased as well as increased connectivity.
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by Yamashita and Tani [47] who induce noise between different hierarchies of
neurons (suggested by [48]). They demonstrated that this leads to the emer-
gence of inflexible, repetitive motor behavior similar to catatonia symptoms. As
this behavior could be also present in ASD, it might be worthwhile to explore
the implications of such an impairment for ASD.
Only a single study focuses on dysconnection in ASD. Park and colleagues
[49, 50] demonstrated that local over-connectivity, especially locally in the pre-
frontal cortex [51], affects which frequency patterns of neural activations emerge
in spiking neural networks.
3.2. Excitation/inhibition imbalance
An excitation/inhibition (E/I) imbalance is among the most commonly ref-
erenced biological evidence for SZ as well as for ASD [52, 53, 54, 55]. E/I im-
balance was found in many neurobiological studies on SZ and ASD. Although
it is not clear how exactly E/I imbalance translates to changes in cognition and
behavior [55], it seems to be linked to core symptoms of both disorders such as
hallucinations [56] and social interaction deficits [57].
An unanswered question is also of which quality this imbalance is. A re-
cent review of studies regarding ASD found vast evidence for increased inhi-
bition as well as increased excitation [58]. Conflicting results in various brain
regions might arise by differences in measurements and their reliability. The
most commonly used mechanisms are magnetic resonance spectroscopy which
allows to measure the cortical levels of glutamate or GABA, measurements of
gamma-band activity (which is hypothesized to be connected to inhibition) or
the analysis of the number of glutamate or GABA receptors in post-mortem
studies [58]. Another possible interpretation of these conflicting results is that
both, increases and decreases, in inhibition and excitation are present in ASD.
This hypothesis was put forward by Nagai and colleagues [59], suggesting that
both impairments share a common underlying mechanism. Their model could
show that increased inhibition and increased excitation can simulate the local
or global processing bias of ASD, respectively.
Gustafsson [60] also connects E/I imbalance to the local processing style
of ASD. He implemented increased inhibition in a SOM, in particular, stronger
inhibition in the surrounding of receptive fields which led to over-discrimination.
For SZ, although E/I imbalance is commonly associated to SZ in the lit-
erature, only the work from [61] explores E/I imbalance as a modeling mech-
anism, which was recently supported by some experimental evidence [62]. In
their model, a stronger excitation or insufficient inhibition caused circular be-
lief propagation: bottom-up and top-down information get mixed up, might be
misinterpreted and over-counted. Due to the scarcity of works in this direction
further investigating in how far E/I imbalance can replicate hallucinations as
suggested in [56] should be subject to future work.
3.3. Hypo-prior theory and aberrant precision account
The increasing popularity of the Bayesian view on the brain in recent years
resulted in many suggestions of how psychiatric disorders could be caused by
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a failure of correctly integrating bottom-up sensory information with top-down
prior expectations. These approaches are inspired by diminished susceptibility
of subjects with psychiatric disorders to visual illusions [63] and the well-known
symptom of hypersensitivity to certain stimuli (e.g. [64]).
Problems in the integration of top-down and bottom-up information can
be explained by an inadequate estimation of the precision of these signals. A
decreased precision of the prior causes a stronger reliance on sensory input,
known as the hypo-prior theory which Pellicano and Burr suggested for ASD in
2012 [65]. Similarly, an increased precision of the bottom-up signal can account
for the same consequences [66]. Despite some initial evidence in favor of an
overrating of sensory information [67], it cannot be decided to date which of
these theories is correct.
For both, ASD and SZ, typically a weaker influence of predictions and a
higher influence of sensory information is suggested [65, 66]. Lawson et al. sub-
stantiated aberrant precision on hierarchical predictive coding where different
cortical layers could account for both hypo-priors and sensory noise influence
[66], leaving open both hypothesis. In an endeavor to clarify how such theories
differ for ASD and SZ, Karvelis and colleagues [67] recently investigated how
healthy individuals, scored for traits of ASD and SZ, use prior information in
a visual motion perception task. Correlation with autistic traits and the usage
of prior information could be confirmed, whereas schizophrenic traits did not
correlate. However, this evidence has to be considered preliminary. In com-
putational models [68], stronger reliance of bottom-up information has been
successfully applied to model delusions and hallucinations as well as deficits in
motor behavior.
However, it might well be and is intuitively plausible that also an overrating
of top-down information can account for the occurrence of hallucinations [69].
In a recent review, Sterzer et al. [70] noticed that too strong as well as too weak
priors were proposed for explaining psychosis. They suggested that the way
that priors are processed might differ depending on the sensory modality or the
hierarchical level of processing, yielding to inconsistent theories and findings.
In line with this idea, computational models for ASD often suggest that an
impairment might be present in both extremes [71, 72]. In [71], repetitive move-
ment could be replicated by an aberrant estimation of sensory precision, leading
to inflexible behavior, either due to sameness of intentional states (increased sen-
sory variance) or due to high error signals and misrecognition (decreased sensory
variance). Similarly, [72] suggests that too strong as well as too weak reliance
on the sensory signal may impair the internal representation of recurrent neural
networks.
Thus, for SZ as well as for ASD, too strong as well as too weak reliance on
priors or sensory information seem to be all valid approaches of modeling and
future work needs to carefully examine which of the theories applies for which
context.
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3.4. Alternative modeling approaches
There are alternative theories used in the discussed computational models.
Synaptic gain, for instance, has been evaluated for SZ [19] as well as for ASD
[73]. In fact, a reduction of synaptic gain might be related to reduced precision
of prior beliefs as discussed in [74].
Furthermore, in particular for ASD, altered parameters often manipulate di-
rectly the generalization capabilities of the network using commonly optimized
network parameters such as number of neurons [75], training time [75, 73], or
regularization factors [73, 76]. These studies are less inspired by biological evi-
dence and focus more strongly on directly replicating observed behavior (mostly
generalization deficits).
Besides, homeostasis has been also proposed as the cause for visual halluci-
nations within the Charles Bonnet syndrome [77] and for tactile hallucinations
[78]. Both were successfully implemented in a Deep Boltzmann machine . How-
ever, it was never studied if is suitable for modelling SZ hallucinations.
4. ANN models of schizophrenia
Tab. 1: Overview of neural network models of schizophrenia
Model type Paper Disorder Characteristic Biological Evidence Approach
Hopfield Networks R. E. Hoffman, T. H. Mc-
Glashan (1987)[18]
Delusions, sense of mind being
controlled by outside force
- Storing of an excessive number of
memories (memory overload)
R. E. Hoffman, T. H. Mc-
Glashan (1989)[43]
Hallucinations, delusions, sense
of mind being controlled by out-
side force
Reduced connectivity in pre-
frontal cortex and other regions
Excessive connection pruning
D. Horn, E. Ruppin
(1995) [79]
Delusions and hallucinations Reactive synaptic regeneration
in frontal cortex
Weakening of external input pro-
jections, increase of internal pro-
jections and noise levels, addi-
tional Hebbian component
Feed-forward NNs J. D. Cohen, D. Servan-
Schreiber (1992) [19]
Disturbances of attention, repre-
sentation of context
Abnormal dopamine activity in
prefrontal cortex
Reduction of activation function
gain in context-neurons
R. E. Hoffman, T. H. Mc-
Glashan (1997) [44]
Auditory hallucinations Reduced connectivity in pre-
frontal cortex and other regions
Excessive connection pruning
R. E. Hoffman et al.
(2011) [45]
Delusionary story reconstuction Abnormal dopamine activity,
cortical disconnections
Increased BP learning rates, ex-
cessive connection pruning in
working memory
Predictive processing Adams et al. (2013) [68] Delusions and hallucinations,
abnormal smooth pursuit eye
movement
Abnormal neuromodulation of
superficial pyramidal cells in
high hierarchical levels
Abnormal precision computation
in the free energy minimization
scheme
Circular inference Jardri and Denve (2013)
[61]
Hallucinations and delusions Disruption in the neural excita-
tory to inhibitory balance
Increased excitation / reduced
inhibition in belief propagation
Recurrent NNs Y. Yamashita, J. Tani
(2012) [47]
Disturbance of self, feeling of be-
ing controlled by outside force,
disorganized movements
Disconnectivities in hierachical
networks of prefrontal and pos-
terior brain regions
Noise between context neuron hi-
erarchies in MTRNN
In the following section, we present the most important ANN models of SZ.
The majority of approaches focus on positive symptoms of SZ, such as hallucina-
tions and delusional behavior, e.g. [79] and [44]. Nevertheless, there have been
also other approaches targeting other symptoms, for instance attention charac-
teristics [19] and movement disorders [47]. An overview of the most important
models is presented in Tab. 1.
4.1. Memory: Hopfield networks
4.1.1. Memory overload
In 1987, Ralph E. Hoffman, professor of psychiatry from Yale, presented the
earliest neural network model of SZ [18], inspired by the suggestions of [16], who
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explored the function of dreams using a neural network model. Hoffman tried
to explain the causes of schizophrenic and maniac disorders with simulations
using a Hopfield Network, an associative memory ANN that is usually employed
to simulate the inner functioning of human memory [80] and to store binary
memory patterns. It is a recurrent neural network that converges to fixed-point
attractors. Its learning is usually based on the famous Hebbian rule, “cells that
fire together wire together”, which means that connections between neurons that
get activated with temporal causality are increased [81]. In order to model SZ,
the author inspected the network attractors’ behavior after storing an increasing
number of binary memories.
Results showed that by increasing the number of binary memory pat-
terns stored, the network reaches “parasitic” states that do not correspond
to previously stored memories. With higher numbers of memories or decreased
storage capacity, the network’s internal energy minima that correspond to the
stored memories might influence each other and create additional deep minima
(attractors) that do not correspond to any previously learned pattern. These
minima might either only influence the information processing course (mind
being controlled by outside force) or lead to convergence to “parasitic states”,
which are compared to hallucinations and delusional thoughts. This study did
not use biological evidence to support its main thesis that SZ might be caused
by memory overload and only compared behavioral observations. However, this
model served as a stepping stone for a successor model (see Section 4.1.2).
4.1.2. Memory model with disconnections
Observations that show diminished metabolism in the prefrontal cortex (hy-
pofrontality) of individuals with SZ led to the theory that excessive synaptic
pruning might be the reason for the appearance of SZ between adolescence and
early adulthood [82, 83]. A decline in synaptic density is a normal developmen-
tal process [46, 84] which might have gone too far in the case of SZ. In 1989,
Hoffman and Dobscha used a Hopfield network as a content-addressable mem-
ory to retrieve previously stored memories giving a similar input [43]. A “neural
Darwinism” principle was applied, which is a pruning rule that erases con-
nections depending on their weights and length. The concrete pruning
rule is shown in Eq. (1), with |Txy| being the weight of the connection between
neurons in coordinates (x, y) and (i, j), and pˆ the pruning coefficient. The
pruning coefficient determines if more or less connections are pruned. Fig. 2
illustrates a possible scenario for this pruning process.
|Txy| = pˆ× [(i− x)2 + (j − y)2] (1)
For a moderate level of pruning, the network is still able to perform the
memory-retrieval task, but for connection reductions of 80% the network shows
fragmented retrieval. This fragmentation was compared to thought disorders
observed in SZ, which lead to incoherence, attention deficits or the feeling that
one’s mind is being controlled by an outside force. Furthermore, sometimes over-
pruned areas converged to patterns not included in any of the stored memories.
12
Fig. 2: Pruning rule used for the Hopfield Network in [43]. The connections are pruned
depending on the connection weight and the distance between the connected neurons. A:
Connections before pruning. B: Connections after pruning. Reprinted from [43].
These were denominated as “parasitic foci”. The authors compared these to
hallucinations in SZ because they contained decodable information that does
not belong to any stored memory. Occasionally, these parasitic regions extended
on a larger area and persisted independently of the input, which was compared
do delusional thoughts observed in patients.
4.1.3. Memory model hippocampal region
In 1995, Horn and Ruppin [79, 85] also introduced a Hopfield-based network
to replicate the positive symptoms of SZ. This model was based on the hy-
pothesis by J. R. Stevens [86] that schizophrenic symptoms might be caused by
“reactive anomalous sprouting and synaptic reorganization taking place at the
frontal lobes, subsequent to the degeneration of temporal neurons projecting
at these areas”. The hypothesis takes into account observations that showed
atrophic changes in the temporal lobe, and at the same time increased dendritic
branching in the frontal lobe of a significant number of schizophrenic patients.
Essentially, the idea is that degenerations in temporal lobe regions that are
connected to the frontal lobe regions might produce a compensatory reaction
in that area, namely increased receptor bindings (frontal lobe connections) and
anomalous dendritic sprouting (increased influence from other cortical areas).
The work by Hoffman explained in the previous section suggested that hal-
lucinations should always appear in combination with memory loss in patients,
which is not always the case. Following the hypothesis from Stevens, the model
from [79] would make hallucinations and intact memory capabilities compatible.
The model used in this paper was a Hopfield network taken from [87, 88],
which is more appropriate for the storage of correlated patterns. This network
is used for a pattern retrieval and recovery task, which means that in its original
functionality, it receives an external input pattern and outputs the previously
learned pattern that corresponds to it, given that a similar one was learned
before.
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Defining the connection strength (weight) between neuron i and j as Wij ,
the learning rule is:
Wij new = cWij old , (c > 1) (2)
Wij =
c0
N
M∑
µ=1
(ξµi − p)(ξµj − p) (3)
where c is the internal projection parameter with value always > 1. Eq. (3)
describes the initial configuration of the network weights, with c0 = 1, p being
the probability that a memory pattern is chosen to be 1, and ξµi one of the
M = αN memory patterns.
The input of each neuron i at time step t is expressed as:
hi(t) =
∑
j
WijSj(t− 1) + e · ξ1i (4)
where e is the network input parameter with value 1 in normal conditions, which
weights the incoming memory pattern, and Sj is the neuron output defined by
a Sigmoid function with noise level T :
Si(t) =
{
1, with prob. 11+exp(−(hi(t)−θ)/T )
0, otherwise
(5)
In order to simulate degenerated temporal lobe projections to the frontal
lobe, the input is scaled down by decreasing parameter e < 1 in Eq. (4). In order
to model increased receptor bindings and dendritic sprouting the parameter c
in Eq. (3) and noise level T in Eq. (5) are increased. The parameter c scales
the internal weights of the network and T influences the neuron activation.
After performing these modifications, the network is still able to retrieve
previously stored memories, but spontaneously converges to certain memories
without a specific input stimulus.
An alternative learning rule during pattern retrieval on a lower time scale is
used to account for increased dopamine levels observed in patients with SZ:
Wij(t) = Wij(t− 1) + γ
N
(S¯i − p)(S¯j − p) (6)
where S¯i is a variable that only becomes 1 if the neuron in question has been
active during the last τ iterations. The authors argue that this component also
represents the continuous learning during a person’s life and that they imagine
γ being large during childhood, but decreasing over time.
To sum up, four network modifications were tested on the presented archi-
tecture (Fig. 3): (1) weakening of the network input parameter e, (2)
increase of internal projections c, (3) increase of noise levels T , and (4)
additional Hebbian learning rule (Eq. (6)), where S¯i is only 1 if neuron i
has been firing during the last τ iterations.
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Fig. 3: Highlighted in red are the modifications made on the Hopfield network to imitate
schizophrenic behavior: Decrease of external input projections, and increase of internal pro-
jections and external noise. Adapted from [79]
Combining the reactive modifications to a decrease of e (internal connections
and external noise) with the described Hebbian rule (even with a small γ of
0.0025), the spontaneous retrievals are enhanced and get continuously triggered
without a concrete retrieval input. This behavior is compared to long-term
hallucinations or delusional beliefs characteristic of schizophrenic patients. This
results would also fit with the effect of dopaminergic blocking agents (equivalent
to reducing the effect of the Hebbian learning rule), which are used to reduce
hallucinations in patients.
4.2. Context, language and feed-forward networks
4.2.1. Attention and context representation
In 1992 the first model based on feed-forward neural networks was intro-
duced. The psychology professor Jonathan D. Cohen and neuroscientist David
Servan-Schreiber [19] presented an extensive analysis of a possible explanation
for negative symptoms in SZ. More concretely, they focused on disturbances of
attention and contextualization problems in schizophrenics, which were for in-
stance reported in [89] and [90]. Their main hypothesis was that schizophrenics
fail to make an internal representation of context and that an abnormal amount
of dopamine in the prefrontal cortex is the main cause (cf. Section 4.1.3 as a com-
parison). The authors refer to previous studies suggesting that the prefrontal
cortex is the brain region responsible for maintaining an internal representations
of context, and that patients with SZ show dysfunctions and abnormal dopamine
levels in this area. In order to test the dopamine-theory of SZ, three experi-
mental tasks were compared to three neural network models, obtaining similar
results to empirical observations. They simulated reduced dopamine activity by
decreasing the gain of the activation function (the activation function’s slope),
described by Eq. (7), in the neurons responsible for context representations. In
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this equation, we used the same nomenclature as in the original paper, where
net is the added activation of all incoming connections, bias the neuron bias
and gain the parameter that is modified. The mentioned idea of modifying the
activation function’s gain was based on studies that suggest that high dopamine
levels potentiate the neurons’ activation (inhibitory and excitatory) in the pre-
frontal cortex. The modification of the gain has a similar effect because higher
gain values increase the activation function’s slope, which means that even small
neuron input values produce either very low neuron activations (equivalent to
inhibitory signals) or high activations (equivalent to excitatory signals).
f(net) =
1
1 + exp(gain · net+ bias) (7)
(a) Stroop test (b) NN model
Fig. 4: Attention and context. (a) Stroop card test used for SZ, reprinted from [91] (b)
Neural network model used for the Stroop task in [19]. Highlighted in red are the neurons
with modified gain.
The first experiment, depicted in Fig. 4, was the Stroop task [92], which
consists of color words printed in different color inks that are presented to the
participants. These words have either congruent stimuli (color and word are
the same), conflicting stimuli (color and word contradict each other) or control
stimuli (color words printed in black ink or “XXX” printed in a certain color).
The subjects must then either always name the letter’s ink color or the writ-
ten word. This exercise is used to test the participant’s attention capacities,
and schizophrenic subjects show overall slower reaction times and perform even
worse when conflicting stimuli are shown [91]. In order to feed the informa-
tion in the network, the printed word’s ink color and meaning were numerically
coded. By reducing the gain on the color naming and word reading units from
1.0 (normal gain) to 0.6 they observed a delay in the response time of the net-
work to properly produce a correct answer, similar to what it was observed in
schizophrenic diagnosed individuals.
The second experiment, shown in Fig. 5, implemented the Continuous Per-
formance Test (CPT) [93] identical pair version [94]. It measures participant’s
ability to detect repeated pattern of symbols in a longer sequence. Symbols are
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(a) CPT test (b) NN model
Fig. 5: Continuous performance test. (a) Simplified CPT Identical Pair test used (b) Neural
network model for the CPT adapted from [19]. Highlighted in red are the neurons whose gain
were manually decreased to 0.6.
presented sequentially and the volunteers must detect when the pattern appears
consecutively, words or numbers, e.g. “9903”. In this experiment schizophren-
ics usually struggle with the detection of longer patterns here previous symbols
need to be taken into account. Prior stimulus module neurons were used to save
the information about previous sequence symbols. To simulate schizophrenic
behavior, the authors reduced the gain of the activation-function of the
task context yielding to a higher miss-rate in concordance with schizophrenic
empirical observations.
Finally, a lexical disambiguation task depending on context was modeled
based on the original work from Chapman et al. [95] (see Fig. 6). Participants
had to solve homonym conflicts (words with more than one meaning), taking
into account the context of the sentence. In this case, schizophrenics show worse
performances when the needed context to resolve ambiguity comes before the
word in question. A similar approach than in the CPT experiment was taken:
context neurons gain were manually reduced to 0.6 as in the previous exper-
iments. It resulted in low performance for the schizophrenic model when the
sentence context needed to interpret the ambiguous word stood at the beginning
of the sentence.
4.2.2. Auditory processing
During a person’s life, the number of neurons in the brain peaks during
childhood and then decreases by a 30% to 40% in adolescence, which is also the
period of time where SZ appears most frequently (adolescence/early adulthood)
[46]. Based on this observation and post-mortem findings that suggest neural
deficits in the schizophrenic’s cerebral cortex [83, 96], Hoffman and McGlashan
designed a feed-forward neural network capable of translating phonetic inputs
into words [44]. This model was inspired by Elman’s (1990) model [97]. As
illustrated in Fig. 7(a) it consists of one hidden layer and a temporal storage
layer that saves a copy of the hidden layer from the previous processing step.
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(a) Task (b) NN model
Fig. 6: Lexical disambiguation. (a) Task with context dependent meaning word. (b) Neural
network model reprinted from [19]. Highlighted in red are the (context) neurons whose gain
was reduced to 0.6.
A pruning rule was used to set the value of all connections below a cer-
tain threshold to zero. After pruning approximately 30% of the connections,
the word detection capabilities of the used network improved2. However, with
excessive pruning the network starts to struggle with detection tasks and shows
spontaneous responses during periods without input (shown in Fig. 7). This
last observation was associated to auditory hallucinations reported in patients
with severe SZ. Furthermore, it supported the common theory that auditory
hallucinations might be caused by false identification of own inner speech as
externally generated.
(a) NN model (b) Word detection results
Fig. 7: Auditory hallucinations (a) Neural network model used in [98]. Input of the network
are simulated phonetic codes, output are semantic features of the input word. Highlighted in
red are the connections the pruning rule was applied on to imitate schizophrenic symptoms.
(b) Word detection results depending on connection pruning. Spontaneous detections are
observed for excessive pruning. Reprinted from [98] with permission.
2Pruning is a bioinspired standard technique for improving generalization of the network.
However, nowadays, dropout approaches have gained popularity over pruning.
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In posterior tests with healthy patients, schizophrenics with auditory halluci-
nations showed reduced word detection capabilities compared to schizophrenics
without, which fits with the previous simulations. Furthermore, a later review
of this paper [98] highlighted that experiments applying active repetitive tran-
scranial magnetic simulation (active rTMS) on the left temporoparietal cortex,
brain region usually associated to speech perception, seemed to reduce halluci-
nations. This further reinforces the hypothesis of a possible correlation between
speech-processing disorders and auditory hallucinations.
4.2.3. Language processing
Another feed-forward model of SZ introduced by R. E. Hoffman and col-
laborators [45] uses a network called DISCERN [99, 100, 101] that is able to
learn narrative language and reproduce learned content, e.g. learn a story and
reproduce it after feeding it with a fraction of the story.
Based on previous studies about SZ, eight different network modifications
were tested: (1) Working Memory (WM) disconnections by pruning of connec-
tions with a weight below a certain threshold, (2) Noise addition in working
memory by adding of Gaussian noise to WM neuron outputs, (3) WM net-
work gain reduction by reducing the activation function’s gain, (4) WM neuron
bias shifts by increasing neuron bias and inducing an increased overall activa-
tion, (5) Semantic network distortions by adding noise to word representations
in semantic memory, (6) Excessive activation semantic networks by increas-
ing neuron outputs in semantic network, (7) Increased semantic priming by
blurring semantic network outputs, (8) Exaggerated prediction-error signaling
(hyperlearning) by increasing back-propagation learning rates.
The resulting network behaviors were compared to empirical results using
a goodness-of-fit measure (GOF), which compared factors such as story recall
success (successfully retelling story), agent confusions (switching of certain story
characters), lexical errors and derailed clauses (false interpretation of certain
sentences). The authors concluded that (8) hyperlearning and (1) WM
disconnections with pruning showed the most reality-similar results. These
results for WM disconnections further reinforce the previously presented theory
by Hoffman and McGlashan in [44] that excessive connection pruning during
human’s adolescence might be one of the causes for this disorder. Moreover, the
authors also suggested that over-learning in schizophrenic brains might cause
modifications in previously stored memories, which might lead to delusional or
erroneous convictions.
4.3. Bayesian approaches
A number of models of psychiatric symptoms are based on the idea that the
brain uses Bayesian inference as a basic principle. This Bayesian brain hypoth-
esis describes the human brain as a generative model of the world that makes
predictions about its environment and adapts its internal model depending on
the observation provided by the senses. The idea was highly influenced by Her-
mann Helmholtz’s work in experimental psychology [102] that dealt with the
brain’s capacity to process ambiguous sensory information. In his words:
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“Visual perception is mediated by unconscious inferences.” H. Helmholtz.
(a) Arcimboldo
painting
(b) Tacher illusion (c) Ocampo painting (d) Dallenbach’s
illusion
Fig. 8: Visual illusions where the brain infers different interpretations depending on the prior
information or context. (a) Ortaggi in una ciotola o l’Ortolano. G. c©Arcimboldo 1590. (b)
Tacher illusion [103]. (c) Forever Allways, c©Octavio Ocampo 1976. (d) Dallenbach’s illusion
1952 [104].
Fig. 8 shows puzzle images that stress that perception depends on prior
knowledge as well as sensory input. For instance, if we rotate Arcimboldo’s
painting by 180 degree instead of vegetables we will see a human face with
a hat. The Tacher illusion can be broken by also rotating the upside down
images, and we will see that both faces are different. In particular, mouth and
eyes are inverted. In Ocampo’s painting, we can see two old people from a
larger distance but two mariachis when viewing the picture from close range.
Finally, Dallenbach’s illusion show that even if you know that there is an animal
looking at you in the picture, it is impossible to see it until the shape of the
cow is highlighted. Afterwards you cannot stop seeing it. In any case, what we
perceive depends not only on the raw sensory information, but also on our prior
knowledge and predictions we have about the world.
The concept of Bayesian inference assuming that the world is one-dimensional
and can be described via Gaussian distributions is illustrated in Fig. 9. The
perception (posterior belief) is inferred from the sensory input (likelihood) and
from the model prediction (prior belief) depending on the precision of prior and
likelihood. For instance, in the case of a very imprecise (highly variable) prior,
the perception would shift more strongly to the direction of the sensory input.
People with SZ and ASD are often found to be more resistant to visual
illusions [105, 106]. Furthermore, they often show stronger sensitivity to sensory
input. These findings led to the suggestion that their inference process, i.e. the
way that they combine sensory inputs with prior information, might differ from
people without such a disorder.
The idea of the Bayesian brain was further combined with mathematical
techniques provided by Bayesian probability theory, yielding models that tried
to imitate mental processes, such as the Laplace-Bayes approach described by
Jaynes [107] and the Helmholtz Machine, a neural network architecture proposed
by Dayan and Hinton [108]. During the last decade, this approach has gained
a lot of support in the neuroscience and computational modeling community.
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This has led to increasingly complex computational models, like the Hierarchical
Temporal Memory (HTM) framework that employs a coincidence detector and
a Markov chain [109].
Fig. 9: Illustration of Bayesian inference: The posterior belief is generated by inference of
prior belief and sensory evidence. Depending on the variance (precision) of prior and sensory
evidence, the posterior belief will be influenced more by one of the previous. Adapted from
[68].
In 1999, Rao and Ballard [110] presented a model of the visual cortex that
proposed the prediction error (i.e., the error between predicted and observed
sensory input) as the information passed to higher hierarchical layers. Other
important studies that followed this approach were the predictive processing
framework and the free-energy principle proposed by Friston [111], which com-
bined the Helmholtz machine ideas [108] with the hierarchical prediction error
message passing and the Bayesian mathematical framework. Furthermore, some
recurrent neural networks architectures have also adopted a similar principle
[112, 113].
4.3.1. Free-energy model of schizophrenia
Friston’s free-energy model [114], probably inspired from his years working
with schizophrenic patients, describes the brain functionality as a dynamical in-
ference network. Despite not being implemented as an ANN model, we included
it in this review because it is considered one of the most relevant models in the
computational neuroscience community.
Under the free-energy principle the brain is seen as a prediction machine
that progressively constructs an internal model of the world which is constantly
improved, based on the received sensory feedback and the resulting prediction
error. Perception (posterior belief) then results from combining the brain’s
predictions (prior) with the sensory evidence (likelihood) as shown in Fig. 9. If
the prior belief’s precision is higher than the sensory evidence, the posterior will
be more similar to the prior. The same applies for the opposite case. Therefore,
precision weights the influence of prior and sensory evidence on the posterior
belief.
Mathematically, the internal model is updated by minimizing the negative
free energy F defined in a simplified form in Eq. (8), a lower bound on the
KL-divergence that quantifies the difference between the internal belief about
21
the world and reality. It depends on the sensory input s and the latent space x
in a hierarchical fashion.
F = ln p(s˜|x˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
likelihood
+ ln p(x˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
prior
(8)
Assuming that µ˜ are the dynamical internal states of the brain, perception is
then described as the adaption of µ˜ given the sensor observations by minimizing
the free energy using the gradient descent method described in Eq. (9):
˙˜µ(t) = Dµ˜(t)− ∂F (s˜, µ˜)
∂µ˜
= Dµ˜(t)− ∂
∂µ˜
Π (9)
where D is a differential matrix operator that computes the currently expected
hidden state,  is the error between the predicted (sensory) input from the higher
layer and the real input (observation) and Π is the precision that defines how
accurate/noisy that information is to produce a correct inference. For instance,
in humans, visual information would have higher precision than proprioceptive
sensing for body localization [115].
Based on these concepts, Adams et al. [68] built a computational model
of SZ for three different scenarios: Birdsong recognition, a visual tracking task
and a simulation of force-matching illusion. Essentially, reducing the encoded
precision of prior knowledge and sensory input during Bayesian inference influ-
enced the behavior of the model. More concretely, decreases in prior precision
(or, for the force-matching illusion: failure to reduce sensory precision) leads to
struggles in birdsong recognition, problems with eye-tracking with occlusion and
attribution of agency (force-match illusion). With an additional compensatory
decrease of sensory precision (for the force-matching illusion: increase of prior
precision), the model showed hallucination-like behavior during the birdsong
recognition task or could not distinguish self-touch and touch from others.
Figure 10 shows the first simulated experiment of the birdsong. A precision
reduction in the prior from the second level results in prediction error
increases (second row). This was interpreted as a failure to predict unsurprising
events (e.g. own actions), which reflects that every event seems to be surprising.
When trying to compensate this effect with reduced sensory precision in the
first level (third row), there is a complete failure of perceptual inference because
of the imprecise sensory information provided by the lower level. Even without
input, inference takes place, which is compared to hallucinations reported by
schizophrenics.
In the remaining two experiments, the authors were also able to reproduce
other schizophrenic symptoms: problems in an object eye-tracking scenario with
occlusion (through prediction error precision reduction in higher levels) and re-
duced force-matching illusion (through reduced sensory attenuation and com-
pensatory prediction error precision increase).
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Fig. 10: Prediction of birdsong (left), prediction error with respect to stimulus (middle) and
used model (right), when last three chirps are omitted. Top row: Unmodified model generates
prediction error increases with the first missing chirp, which corresponds to normal behavior.
Middle row: With reduced precision at second level the model is unable to predict the third
chirp, and the prediction error for missing chirps is reduced. Bottom row: With compensatory
sensory precision reduction in first level, there is a complete failure of perceptual inference.
Despite the wrong predictions, almost no prediction error is generated due to missing precise
sensory information. This behavior is compared to auditory hallucinations. Reprinted from
[68] with kind permission.
4.3.2. Bayesian graphical models
In [61], Jardri and Dene´ve presented a hierarchical Bayesian graphical model
(i.e, circular inference) which used the belief propagation algorithm in order to
model how excitation/inhibition imbalance can cause erroneous percepts (hal-
lucinations) and fixed false beliefs (delusions).
Messages were passed between nodes in different hierarchical levels anal-
ogously to belief propagation. Low hierarchical levels correspond to sensory
experience and high levels to top-down predictions. Message passing was ex-
pressed by the following equation:
Mn+1ji =
{
Wij(B
n
i − αdMnij) if i is above j
Wij(B
n
i − αcMnij) if j is above i
(10)
where Mnij is the message sent from i to j at step n, B
n
i is the computed belief,
Wij is the connection strength, and αd and αc are the parameters that scale of
the inhibitory downward and upward loops respectively. The term above means
that the node i is in a higher hierarchical level than j.
They experimented with the two α parameters, adjusting them between 1
(normal level of inhibition) and 0 (no inhibition). Simulated results show that
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equally impaired loops (same α below 1) are still able to arrive at a proper
inference. Conversely, with unbalanced impaired upward loops (αu < 1) “over-
estimation of the strength of sensory evidence and an underweighting of the
prior” is produced. This is compatible with over-interpretation of sensory evi-
dence and the reduced influence to illusions observed in schizophrenic patients.
Furthermore, in [62] they show that the circular inference model fit nicely
with SZ diagnosed patients decisions using the Fisher task as the experimental
paradigm. The Fisher task permits the manipulation of the prior and the like-
lihood allowing comparisons with the Bayesian model predictions. Participants
have to decide whether the fish captured comes from the left or the right lake.
First, two boxes (left, right) with fish and different sizes are presented (prior):
bigger box express higher probability. Secondly, the two lakes (left, right) are
presented with fishes inside with two colors (red and black). The proportion
of red fishes represent the likelihood of the observation. Finally, participants
have to decide if the red fish comes from the left or the right. According to the
participants data and their proposed model, descending and ascending loops
correlated with negative and positive SZ symptoms respectively.
4.4. Recurrent neural networks
In 2012, Yamashita and Tani presented a model of SZ using a Multiple
Timescale Recurrent Neural Network (MTRNN) [113]. Recurrent neural net-
works (RNN) are used for the recognition and generation of time series, specif-
ically in this study, they are used for sensorimotor sequence learning. The
MTRNN is a special type of RNN that mimics the hierarchical structure of ani-
mal motor control systems. Biological observations have suggested that human
and animal motor movements are segmented into so-called “primitives”. These
primitives can then be reused and combined to more complex motor sequences.
The MTRNN contains neurons working in different timescales: fast context
units (neurons) learn the motion primitives and slow context units work as a
sequence generator (see Fig. 11). This network is trained to perform prediction
error minimization, i.e. to build an internal model of the world following the
Bayesian brain idea. Training the network using the Backpropagation Through
Time algorithm (BPTT), the robot is able to learn multiple motions (e.g., grab-
bing an object) adapting to different object positions. It is also able to combine
these actions into new action sequences by only training the slow context units.
The trained network works as a predictor where the sensory input modulates
the changes on the slow context units (goals) depending on the error3.
Equation 11 describes the dynamics of each neuron at each layer:
τ u˙i,t = −ui,j +
∑
j
wi,j · xj,t. (11)
3There is a strong parallelism between Multiple Timescale RNNs and the hierarchical
model proposed by Friston.
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Fig. 11: (A) Tasks to be performed by the robot: when the object is on the Right move the
object backward and forward, when the object is on the Left move the object up and down.
(B) MTRNN network architecture. Highlighted in red are the connections between fast and
slow context units that are degraded with noise to imitate schizophrenic behavior. Adapted
from [47].
In this formula, the membrane potential ui,t of neuron i in time step t is updated
with the neural state xj,t of neuron j scaled with the (learnable) connection
weights wi,j The time constant τ determines the update frequency of the neuron.
A small time constant is used for fast context units, and a large time constant
for slow context units.
Schizophrenics can have trouble to distinguish self-generated actions from
others and in severe cases of SZ, patients can even have problems perform-
ing movements, and show repetitive or stereotypical behavior [31]. Based on
observations that suggest that SZ may be caused by disconnections in hierar-
chical brain regions, mainly between prefrontal and posterior regions [48, 116],
uniformly distributed random noise was added in the connections be-
tween fast and slow context units highlighted in Fig. 11 with the red circle.
For the evaluation of the model a humanoid robot was used. It had the task
of locating an object on a table in front of it and performed different actions
depending on the object’s position: if the object was located to the right, the
robot was supposed to grab the object and move it back and forth three times.
Otherwise, if the object was located to the left, the robot had to grab the object
and move it up and down three times.
They showed that for a small degree of disconnection (small noise addi-
tion) the robot had no problems to perform the mentioned task. Nevertheless,
increases of spontaneous prediction error were observed and abnormal state
switching appeared in the intention-network (slow units). The authors com-
pared these prediction errors to patient’s problems in attribution of agency.
Schizophrenics might want to perform an action and have an internal predic-
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tion of the upcoming proprioceptive and external states. The increases of pre-
diction error could be seen as incongruences between the intended actions and
the results, which can give a person the feeling of not being able to control
the consequences of its own actions or it may have problems to perceive these
actions as self-generated. For more severe disconnections, the humanoid robot
clearly struggled to perform the given task and showed disorganized sequences
of movements. These observations were compared to more severe cases of SZ,
where cataleptic (stopping) and stereotypical (repetitive) behaviors have been
observed.
4.5. Other approaches to delusions and hallucinations
Self-organizing maps (SOM) were also used in [17] as a potential model for
schizophrenic delusions, however no specific implementation has been tested
until now.
Finally, Deep Restricted Boltzmann Machines (Deep-RBM) have been tested
for hallucinations [77, 78]. Although they targeted a different disorders, the sim-
ilarities are interesting from the computational modeling point of view. They
were able to induce hallucinations after training generating spontaneous activa-
tions and producing patterns based on the learned ones.
5. ANN models of autistic spectrum disorder
Deficits in social interaction are often the most obvious symptoms of ASD.
Hence, for a long time, ASD was mainly considered as a disorder of theory
of mind, suggesting that individuals with ASD are characterized by absence
or weakening of their ability to reason about the beliefs and mental states of
others in social contexts [117]. Whereas this explanation could account for a vast
amount of symptoms that become obvious in development and socialization of
children with ASD, it was mainly criticized due to its failure to explain similarly
prominent non-social symptoms such as restricted interests, desire for sameness
or excellent performance in specific areas.
An alternative was suggested in the 90’s with the weak central coherence the-
ory [118, 119]. It sees the underlying causes of ASD in the perceptual domain,
namely in difficulties to integrate low-level information with higher-level con-
structs. This “inability to integrate pieces of information into coherent wholes
(central coherence)”, stated in [120], could offer explanations for the aforemen-
tioned deficits and also be extended to an explanation of social deficits. An
even broader view is provided by the Bayesian brain hypothesis which suggests
general deficits in the processing of predictions and sensory information, and
can be applied to non-visual perception as well as motor abilities.
Computational models of ASD mainly focus on the atypical processing style
suggested by the weak central coherence theory which could be summarized as
excessive attention to detail. The majority of models we discuss here replicate
deficits in perception [75, 73, 60, 59]. Some also tackle atypicalities in mem-
ory structure and internal representations [121, 72] and inflexibility in motor
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behavior [71]. Although most studies suggest connections to social deficits in
an indirect way, only one of the models makes a direct connection to theory
of mind, by modeling weak central coherence on the level of logical reasoning
[122]. An overview of the presented approaches is given in Tab. 2.
Tab. 2: Overview of neural network models of ASD
Model type Paper Disorder Characteristic Biological Evidence Approach
Feed-forward and Simple Recurrent NNs I. L. Cohen [75, 123]
(1994, 1998)
Generalization deficits due to ex-
cessive attention to detail
Abnormal neural density in var-
ious brain regions
Excessive or reduced number of
neurons, increased training dura-
tion
J. L. McClelland (2000)
[121]
Hyperspecificity of memory con-
cepts
– Excessive conjunctive coding
Dovgopoly & Mercado
[73] (2013)
Deficits in visual categorization
and generalization
Abnormalities in synaptic plas-
ticity
Reduced learning rate, neg-
ative weight decay (anti-
regularization)
Self-Organizing Maps L. Gustafsson (1997) [60] Excessive attention to detail Lateral inhibition enhances sen-
sory perception
Excessive inhibitory lateral feed-
back
L. Gustafsson et al.
(2004) [124]
Avoidance of novelty – Familiarity preference, higher
weighting of close data points
G. Noriega (2007) [125] Domain-based hypersensitivity Early brain overgrowth in chil-
dren with ASD
Variable (increasing) number of
neurons, stronger/weaker atten-
tion to stimuli
G. Noriega (2008) [126] Domain-based hypersensitivity Early brain overgrowth in chil-
dren with ASD
Propagation delays in neural
weight updates
Convolutional NN Y. Nagai et al. (2015) [59] Local/global processing bias Excitation/inhibition imbalance Excitation/inhibition imbalance
in visual processing
Spiking NNs J. Park et al. (2019) [49] Atypical neural activity: High
power in higher frequency bands
and decreased signal complexity
Increased short-range connectiv-
ity in frontal cortex and atypical-
ities in resting-state EEG
Local over-connectivity
Predictive coding Pellicano & Burr (2012)
[65]
Excessive attention to detail – Hypo-prior: lower precision of
prior, stronger focus on sensory
input
Lawson et al. (2014) [66] Excessive attention to detail Stronger activation in visual cor-
tex than in prefrontal cortex in
ASD
Hypo-prior or hyper sensory in-
put: Precision imbalance that
leads to excessive reliance on in-
put
Recurrent NNs H. Idei et al. (2017) [71] Stereotypical behaviors – Modification of variance estima-
tion (sensory precision)
Philippsen & Nagai (2018)
[72]
Reduced generalization capabil-
ity, heterogeneity among sub-
jects
– Modification of reliance on exter-
nal signal and of variance estima-
tion (sensory precision)
Ahmadi & Tani (2017)
[76]
Generalization deficits – Regularization
Other approaches O’Loughlin and Thagard
(2000) [122]
Weak coherence, Theory of Mind
impairment
– Impairment of coherence opti-
mization in logical reasoning due
to strong inhibition
5.1. Feed-forward and simple recurrent neural networks
First, we describe approaches using simple connectionist models, typically
feed-forward networks for classification tasks. Recurrent connections might be
included at a structural level, but networks are not supposed to learn temporal
sequences, which is why we refer to them as Simple Recurrent NN. These ap-
proaches mainly explored parameters of the network such as number of neurons
or learning rate.
5.1.1. Generalization deficits through overfitting
The first neural network model of ASD was proposed by Ira L. Cohen in
1994 [75]. It was a feed-forward neural network trained with back-propagation
and investigated basic properties of neural networks. Based on studies that sug-
gested that individuals with autism have either too few or too many neurons and
neuronal connections (e.g. [127]), the influence of increased or reduced number
of hidden neurons was analyzed. The evaluated task was to classify children
with ASD and children with mental retardation into two groups, using features
obtained via a diagnostic interview [128]. Note that although the considered
task was related to ASD, the chosen task is just taken as an example and is not
crucial for the findings of this paper.
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A training and a test set were used to analyze the network’s accuracy and
generalization abilities. The results were compared for an increasing number of
hidden units and through different number of trials. The results showed that
a small number of hidden neurons translates into low accuracy (high training
error) and bad generalization (high testing error) and an increased number of
hidden neurons improved the network’s learning accuracy and generalization.
When the number of hidden neurons was largely increased, its general-
ization ability decreased: the network learned too much details of the input data
and was not able to adapt to new input data. An increased number of train-
ing trials (longer training duration) had a similar effect. For the training
set, the network accuracy increased with longer training duration. However,
with the test set, the network again showed signs of overfitting, as the accuracy
decreased significantly.
Cohen compared these results qualitatively to the learning and behavioral
characteristics of children with ASD. In particular, many individuals with ASD
show great discrimination capabilities and have no problems with already learned
routines, but have problems when trying to abstract information or when con-
fronted with new situations.
Cohen extended this approach in 1998 [123] to the generalization capability
in the presence of extraneous inputs to the network (set to random values). In
the task of classifying happy and sad expressions of a simplified cartoon face,
generalization was strongly impaired in the presence of extraneous inputs. This
might suggest that networks trained for too long tend to attend more to non-
relevant input information, instead of focusing on the more informative input
neurons.
5.1.2. Precision of memory representations
In [121], James L. McClelland addressed the tendency of children with ASD
to represent concepts in a too specific way, which results in difficulties to recog-
nize two different instances of an object as the same category.
He suggested that in neural networks, this could be explained with the con-
cept of excessive conjunctive coding. Typically, similar inputs to a neural net-
work lead to similar neuron activation patterns. Such pattern overlaps can be
useful for sharing existing knowledge and establishing associations. However,
too strong associations can also cause interference. Conjunctive coding describes
the reduction of such overlap by recoding the input patterns with neurons which
only become active for particular combinations of elements. Assuming that what
characterizes healthy human learning is a balance between generalization and
discrimination, the representation of concepts in subjects with ASD could be
characterized by excessive conjunctive coding. This would make a neural
network loose the ability to generalize, as activation pattern overlaps cannot be
exploited. This idea was not tested, but the author used the neural network
shown in Fig. 12 to explain his reasoning.
McClelland presented the example of a semantic network used in [129], as
a model of organization of knowledge in memory (see Fig. 12). This model
was used to associate words with their meaning, e.g. “robin” and “can” trigger
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Fig. 12: Semantic network used to explain the conjunctive coding hypothesis. In the hid-
den layers, the feed-forward neural network generates internal representations of the inputs
(highlighted in red). Words describing similar concepts should produce similar internal repre-
sentations that overlap with each other. The author suggests that excessive conjunctive coding
to avoid these overlaps could produce excessive discrimination, such as in autistic perception.
Adapted from [121].
the outputs “grow”, “move” and “fly” because these are the actions a “robin”
can perform. The internal layer of the network (highlighted in red in Fig. 12)
progressively learns to code the meaning of input words during learning. This
means that “robin” and “canary” should cause a very similar activation pattern
because a robin has much more in common with a canary than, for instance,
a tree. The author suggests that hyperspecificity in perception and memory
representations of ASD children might be caused by an abnormality during this
process. Namely, excessive conjunctive coding in the internal layer is proposed
as a mechanism: an excessive reduction of overlap between representations of
similar concept might cause the reported hyperspecificity which would result in
generalization deficits. No concrete network parameters are proposed, but it can
be imagined that such an effect might be achieved by increasing the number of
neurons in the internal layer. In this regard, the approach is similar to Cohen’s
suggestion [75], but extended to learning of representations.
5.1.3. Generalization and categorization abilities in visual perception
Dovgopoly and Mercado [73] used an existing model of visual object per-
ception [130] to replicate deficits in classification and generalization in ASD.
The neural network was a feed-forward network, which modeled visual input
processing via two pathways: the ventral cortical pathway (for object identifi-
cation, including recurrent connections), and the dorsal cortical pathway (for
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processing of location-relevant information).
The authors replicated behavioral data from [131] and [132], separately on
both visual pathways, which show deficits in generalization and prototoype for-
mation in children with high-functioning ASD. The experiment was the clas-
sification of random dot patterns as category or non-category stimuli [131], or
as category A or category B stimuli [132]. After adjusting the parameters for
replicating typical behavior, four different parameter modifications were tested
individually to replicate the data from ASD children. Following evidence for
abnormalities in synaptic plasticity in individuals with ASD (e.g. [133, 134]),
the first two parameters modified how weights in the network were updated.
First, the learning rate was decreased, which corresponds to reduced
synaptic plasticity in biological neurons. As a result, network training takes
longer and is more prone to lead to exhibit overfitting. Second, generaliza-
tion of the network was impaired by suppressing regularization using
negative weight decay. Weight decay is a method for regularizing neural net-
works and improving their generalization abilities by keeping the connection
weights small [135]. Typically, weight decay punishes large weights by adding
a term λ~w′ ~w to the error function. With a negative weight decay factor λ
instead, anti-regularization is performed, encouraging the increase of weight
magnitudes, and, thus, over-complex classification rules. Third, they tested the
influence of increasing and decreasing the number of hidden neurons
similar to [75, 123], based on neurological evidence of an increased number of
cortical minicolumns in the brain of individuals with ASD [136]. Finally, the
authors adjusted the gain of the neuron’s activation function, to model
the increased level of noise that is hypothesized to underlie the relative
increase in cortical excitation observed in ASD subjects [52, 57].
The gain G of the activation function, as displayed in Eq. (12), manipulates
the slope of the activation function. A smaller gain reduces the slope, and makes
the network more prone to pass noise instead of signal information to the next
processing layers.
s(x) =
1
1 + exp−(G · x+ b) (12)
where x represents the input to the activation function and b is a bias term.
Good replications of the behavioral data were achieved with a decrease of
learning rate and a negative weight decay. A negative weight decay also caused
a high variability of generalization abilities, depending on the initial network
weights, providing a potential explanation for the heterogeneity of findings be-
tween different studies. In contrast to [75, 123], an increased number of neurons
did not replicate the generalization deficit in ASD children. Moreover, the gain
of the activation function could not fully account for the generalization deficit.
5.2. Self-organizing maps
Self-organizing maps (SOMs) are ANNs that are usually used for unsuper-
vised learning and clustering tasks. They model the functionality of cortical
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Fig. 13: Mexican-hat function of the SOM. It defines the strength of lateral connections
depending on distance to current neuron. The red arrows point to the part that is modified
to simulate autistic perception (excessive lateral feedback inhibition). Adapted from [60].
feature maps, which are spatially organized neurons that respond to stimuli
and self-organize according to the features in stimuli. They are able to learn
the relation of different input data such as different sensory inputs. Approaches
for modeling ASD with SOMs typically investigate the formation of higher-level
representations from sensory input.
5.2.1. Increased lateral feedback inhibition
Lennart Gustafsson presented two models of ASD using SOMs in [60] and
[124]. Inspired by findings on weak central coherence in subjects with ASD
and an enhanced ability to discriminate sensory stimuli [118], he suggested that
alterations in the lateral feedback weights between the SOM neurons could result
in atypicalities in perception [137].
In a SOM, each neuron typically has excitatory connections to close neigh-
bors and inhibitory connections to more distant neighbors. They tuned the
Mexican-hat curve (Fig. 13) to induce stronger lateral feedback inhibition. Such
activation patterns are similar to receptive fields in biological cortices and have
been used to model center-surround operators in the visual cortex. Manipulating
the lateral connections to achieve a stronger inhibition (such that the integral of
the function in Fig. 13 becomes negative), the sensory discrimination ability of
the network is increased. Neural columns focus on more narrow features during
learning which slows down convergence and might lead to a fragmented feature
map. However, excessive lateral inhibition will degrade discriminatory power
and cause instabilities in information processing. This behavior is compared to
autistic over-discrimination and may also explain fascination or fright of moving
objects, due to the instability of its cortical feature maps.
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5.2.2. Familiarity preference
In [124], Gustafsson and Paplin´ski evaluated the effect of attention-shift im-
pairment and avoidance of novelty on the formation of cortical feature maps.
The used SOM received input stimuli from two sources (compared to two “di-
alects of a language”), each of which produces 30 different stimuli (“speech
sounds”) grouped in three clusters (“phonemes”).
The computational model was run in four different modes. In the first mode,
attention was always shifted to the source producing novel input (considered as
normal learning). In the second mode, an attention-shift impairment was mod-
eled by shifting attention to novel sources with a very low probability. The third
mode implements familiarity preference: attention is shifted to novel sources
only if the map is familiar with that source (measured as mean distance of
the current stimulus to the map nodes). This map develops a preference over
learning to the more familiar source. Finally, a model with both familiarity
preference and attention-shift impairment was applied.
The simulation results showed that familiarity preference leads to precise
learning of the stimuli from one of the sources (the source with lower variability)
in expense of the other source. This might remind of ASD individuals’ character-
istic of learning in great detail a narrow field, which leads to increased discrim-
ination and poor generalization. The authors also showed that this impairment
can be counteracted by modifying the probabilities of stimuli presentation in re-
sponse to the system, similar to early intervention in children’s learning process.
Maps learned with attention-shift were not impaired, whereas a combination of
both mechanisms only sometimes led to an impairment. The authors concluded
that, in contrast to speculations in previous work [138], familiarity preference,
rather than attention-shift is a more likely cause for ASD.
5.2.3. Unfolding of feature maps and stimuli coverage
In 2007, Gerardo Noriega [125] modeled abnormalities in the feature coverage
and the unfolding of feature maps in SOMs. Neurological evidence suggests ab-
normal brain development in children with ASD [139], typically reporting larger
growth in young children, which gets reduced later in life [140, 141]. These ab-
normalities were modeled by manipulating the number of network nodes during
the training of the SOM where the structure emerges. Thus, the network di-
mension is temporarily increased.
Results showed that such disturbance in the physical structure of a SOM
does not affect stimuli coverage, but impairs the unfolding of feature maps
which might result in sub-optimal representations. Furthermore, the author
models hyper- and hyposensitivity to stimuli in a similar way like [60] using
lateral interactions between neurons. Hyper- or hyposensitivity was modeled
by adjusting the neuron weights toward the winner neuron, either with a posi-
tive factor (attraction, or hypersensitivity) or with a negative factor (repulsion,
or hyposensitivity). This factor converges exponentially toward zero (normal
sensitivity) during map formation. The authors showed that hypersensitivity
to one of the input domains (stronger attention to this domain, i.e. restricted
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interests), improves the coverage of stimuli in this domain, but too strong hy-
persensitivity or a hyposensitivity to stimuli reduces coverage 4.
One year later, Noriega extended his approach in [126], investigating prop-
agation delays between neurons. Unlike in normal SOMs where all neurons
propagate the information instantaneously to all neighboring neurons, Noriega
presented a biologically more realistic approach by introducing delays in the up-
date. He shows that decreased propagation speed has a negative effect on stimuli
coverage. As the delayed propagation causes the arrival of competing stimuli at
the same time at a neuron, he also altered the way in which these competing
stimuli are handled. In his experiments, a high dilution factor, meaning that
incoming stimuli are averaged instead of being handled separately, decreased
the stimuli coverage and also impaired the topological structure of the map.
5.3. Convolutional neural networks and inhibition imbalance
In 2015, Y. Nagai and colleagues presented an ANN network based on
Fukushima’s neocognitron ([142], [143], [144]), seen as the basis for convolutional
neural networks, to model visual processing in ASD [59]. The hypothesis con-
sidered was that there is an excitation/inhibition imbalance in ASD [53, 54, 57].
The structure of the neocognitron for visual processing is illustrated in
Fig. 14. The network is trained to recognize patterns by adjusting the weights
between UC and US layers. The S-cells in the US layers perform feature extrac-
tion. They receive excitatory input from the C-cells in the preceding layer, and
inhibitory connections from the V-cells in the same layer. During training, the
excitatory connections aSl are updated and the inhibitory connections bSl are
calculated accordingly.
The network was trained for the recognition of numbers ”0” to ”9” in large
or small size at different positions. After training, the model was tested with
compound numbers (cf. Fig. 15 left) where a larger number is created from
multiple smaller numbers. The trained network is able to detect both global
(large number, here “2”) and local (small numbers, here “3”) patterns for α =
1 and 0.9, but shows a preference for the global pattern, characteristics that
correspond to observations with healthy individuals [145].
It is known that people with ASD perform differently in such a task, primar-
ily focusing their attention on the details (i.e. the smaller number instead of
the larger one). In order to simulate this local processing bias, an imbalance of
excitatory and inhibitory connections was simulated by scaling the inhibitory
weight bSl with a factor α.
The results show that a moderate increase of α, which corresponds to in-
creasing inhibition, causes the network to rather detect local patterns, replicat-
ing the local processing bias in ASD. When reducing α (increasing excitation),
the network does not show any processing bias, rather it looses its ability to
4Hypersensitivity in [60] was implemented as increased inhibition in the neighborhood of
neurons (higher specificity of perception), whereas this approach interprets hypersensitivity
as a stronger attraction of neighboring signals to signals from a specific domain.
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Fig. 14: Left: Overview of the neocognitron’s structure. Right: Detailed view of the connec-
tions between C-cell layers UC and S-cell layers US . Highlighted in red are the inhibitory con-
nections that are modified to influence the ratio between inhibition and excitation. Adapted
from [59].
differentiate patterns. These results fit with ASD symptoms of hyperesthesia
(increased focus on detail) and hypoesthesia (no bias and general difficulty in
pattern recognition) and suggest that excitation/inhibition imbalance could ac-
count for these symptoms.
Fig. 15: The neocognitron is fed with a visual stimulus consisting of local patterns (here 3 )
and global patterns (here 2 ), which are incongruent. In normal conditions the network should
be able to detect both local and global patterns.
5.4. Spiking neural networks and local over-connectivity
In [146] and a follow-up study in [49], it was proposed to use spiking neural
network as computational models to investigate the consequences of local over-
connectivity, which was found in the prefrontal cortex of ASD brains [51]. The
hypothesis considered was that local over-connectivity affects frequency patterns
of neural activations.
A spiking neural network is more closely inspired by natural neural net-
works [147]. Whereas in standard artificial neural networks each neuron fires
every time step, neurons in a spiking network only fire if their potential (similar
to the membrane potential of biological neurons) reaches a certain threshold.
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Fig. 16: Three different networks with different degrees of randomness. (a) is a locally over-
connected network (corresponding to ASD individuals), (b) is a small-world network with
many local clusters and a few longer connections (corresponding to typically developed in-
dividuals), (c) is a random network including many wide-range connections. (d) shows the
structure of each single neuron group with excitatory (red) and inhibitory (blue) connections.
Note that the number of nodes and edges in (a), (b) and (c) remains the same. Reprinted
with permission from [49], originally based on [149].
Therefore, more complex firing patterns occur ranging over various frequency
bands, comparable to patterns visible in EEG.
The authors investigated the hypothesis that an increased number of short-
range connections might cause reduced complexity and differences in the fre-
quency bands which were found in resting-state EEG studies of the brains of
ASD subjects [148]. To manipulate the degree of local over-connectivity in
the network, a parameter based on the small-world paradigm from [149] was
used. By default, neurons are connected to six neighboring neurons in a ring
lattice as displayed in Fig. 16 (left). A parameter pWS expresses the probability
for each of the connections to rewire to other neurons. Thus, pWS determines
the randomness of the network (Fig. 16), ranging from regular lattice struc-
ture (pWS = 0) to random wiring (pWS = 1). Medium values of pWS around
0.2 describe typically developed networks with local clusters and some short-
range connections between the clusters. Notably, the parameter from [149] keeps
the overall number of connections in the network intact, such that differences
emerge only due to differences in the network structure, not by the total number
of neurons or neural connections.
Networks are formed by generating 100 groups of neurons, corresponding to
the brown nodes in Fig. 16. Each group contains 1000 spiking neurons: 800
excitatory and 200 inhibitory neurons, which have an increasing or decreasing
effect on the firing probability of postsynaptic neurons, respectively. Neurons
are mainly connected to neurons of the same neuron group (intra-group con-
nections), and have connections to six neighboring groups according to Fig. 16
(inter-group connections). Different rewiring probabilities pWS between 0 and
1 are used to determine the initial inter-group connectivity of the network.
After initialization, the network updates its connections according to the
rules of spike-time-dependent plasticity [150]: the update of connection weights
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occurs depending on the timing of firing of the pre- and postsynaptic neurons. If
the postsynaptic neuron fires within a certain time window after the presynaptic
neuron, the weight of the connection is increased (corresponding to the biological
process of long term potentiation). If the presynaptic neuron fires within a
time window after the postsynaptic neuron, the connection weight is weakened
(long term depression). During this learning period the connection weights self-
organize. Tonic random input is presented to the network. After learning, the
spontaneous activity of the neurons was recorded (in the absence of input), and
compared to the graph-theoretical properties of the network.
The activation patterns were evaluated according to their frequency spec-
trum and the complexity of the time series, as measured by the multiscale en-
tropy [151]. This measure rates the informative content of time series at different
temporal scales. High complexity corresponds to the presence of long-range cor-
relations on multiple scales in space and time, low complexity is computed for
time-series with perfect regularity or randomness. The evaluation suggested
that networks exhibiting local over-connectivity generate more oscillations in
high-frequency bands and exhibit lower complexity in the signals than small-
world networks. Findings of atypical resting-state EEG for people with ASD,
thus, might be explained by local over-connectivity in their brains.
5.5. Bayesian approaches
There are promising models in the literature interpreting ASD on the basis of
the Bayesian framework. However, most of these approaches are only conceptual
and still lack an implementation. Nevertheless, these approaches are able to
explain a wide range of different symptoms which might be caused by an atypical
integration of prediction and sensory information [66, 65].
The first approach supported by the Bayesian brain hypothesis for explain-
ing the non-social symptoms of ASD was proposed by Pellicano and Burr in
2012 [65]. Their hypo-prior hypothesis suggests that broader or less precise
priors cause people with ASD to rely less on their predictions and stronger on
sensory input which could explain the hypersensitivity of people with ASD. J.
Brock broadened this idea [152] by proposing that hypersensitivity cannot only
be caused by a reduced precision of the prior, but also by an increased precision
of sensory input. Lawson and colleagues (2014) [66] summarized these ideas,
arguing that both modifications reduced prior precision or increased sen-
sory precision, can cause the same functional consequences. They suggest
that the cause could be aberrant precision in general: Expected precision is an
important variable that helps us to decide whether to stronger rely on sensory
information or prior predictions. Aberrant precision, thus, would alter the way
in which we determine whether or not to take the prediction error into account.
People with ASD might have problems to accurately estimate this precision.
Thus, they might, at the one extreme, try to minimize the prediction error too
strongly, or, at the other extreme, fail to minimize the prediction error.
In [153], Lawson and colleagues present a study demonstrating that the
difference in subjects with ASD seems to be that they overestimate the volatility
of the environment. They model the experimental findings using Hierarchical
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Gaussian Filters. The model parameter that best accounts for the differences
in ASD and non-ASD subjects was a meta-parameter describing the model’s
predictions about predictions. These findings suggest that people with ASD
might build less or weaker expectations about the environment and, therefore,
are less surprised in the case of extraordinary events, but constantly moderately
surprised.
5.6. Recurrent neural networks
The studies presented here follow the idea of predictive coding which can be
seen as an implementation of the Bayesian brain idea: an RNN is used as an
internal model of the world and its learning corresponds to the process of adapt-
ing network weights in order to perform prediction error minimization. The role
of the network is to learn to predict sensory consequences, and integrates these
predictions with the perceived sensory information.
5.6.1. Freezing and repetitive behavior in a robotics experiment
Idei and colleagues used the stochastic continuous-time recurrent neural net-
work (S-CTRNN) [112] model with parametric bias (PB) [154] to teach a robot
to interact with a human in a ball-playing game. The S-CTRNN with PB learns
to predict a time series of proprioceptive (joint angles) and vision features. From
the current input, the network estimates the next time step (output) and its
predicted precision (variance) as shown in Fig. 17. The state of the PB units
reflect the intention of the network, i.e. the ball-playing pattern that the robot
believes that they are currently engaged in.
The S-CTRNN was trained offline to perform certain tasks depending on a
yellow ball’s position, as depicted in Fig. 17 (left). Synaptic weights and biases
of the network, as well as the internal states of the PB units are updated via
the backpropagation through time (BPTT) algorithm in order to maximize the
likelihood in Eq. (13). This equation describes that at time step t of training
sequence s, the network output of the i-th neuron (a normal distribution defined
by the estimated mean (output) y and estimated variance v) properly reflects
the desired input data yˆ.
L
(s)
t,i = −
ln (2piv
(s)
t,i )
2
− (yˆ
(s)
t,i − y(s)t,i )2
2v
(s)
t,i
(13)
After training, a recognition mechanism (via adaptation of the PB units,
while keeping weights and biases fixed) enables the network to switch its behav-
ior depending on the current situation.
To model ASD behavior, the estimated variance (sensory precision) is
modified in the activation function of the variance units with the constant K
in Eq. (14), where  is the minimum value and u
(s)
t,i is the output of the i-th
context unit time step t for movement sequence s.
v
(s)
t,i = exp(u
(s)
t,i +K) +  (14)
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Fig. 17: Left: Overview of the interactive tasks the robot must perform. Right: Overview of
the ANN model used for the experiments. Highlighted in red are the variance units where a
constant K is added to increase or decrease the sensory precision in order to imitate autistic
behavior. Adapted from [71].
Experimental results with a humanoid NAO robot showed that for K = 0
the robot behaved normally. For increased variance (reduced precision), the
robot seemed to ignore prediction error and performed stopping and stereotypic
movements. For decreased variance (increased precision), the robot performed
mistaken movement changes or concentrated on certain movements, which also
led to sudden freezing and repetitive movements. These results fit with the
disordered motor system reported in ASD [155], but add the surprising difference
to previous studies that increased and decreased sensory precision seem to show
the same consequences.
5.6.2. Impairment in internal network representations
Another study using the S-CTRNN to model ASD characteristics is [72]. Us-
ing an S-CTRNN [112], the authors modify two parameters which control how
the network makes predictions. Conversely to the other RNN model, which
concentrates on replicating behavioral patterns, this study investigates “invis-
ible” features characterizing the network’s learning process. More specifically,
the authors evaluate how attention to sensory input and deficits in the
prediction of trajectory noise influences the internal representation
that a network acquires during learning.
The network as displayed in Fig. 18 is trained to recognize and draw ellipses
and “eight” shapes, located at four different (overlapping) positions of the input
space (cf. Fig. 19(b)). Inputs and outputs are two-dimensional and the recurrent
context layer comprises 70 neurons. Learning is modified in two ways: The
parameter χ determines how much the network relies on external input, as
opposed to its own prediction, i.e. χ gradually switches between open-loop
(χ = 1) and near-closed-loop (χ ≈ 0) control. The second parameter K is
defined analogous to [71] (see Eq. (14)) and manipulates the estimated variance
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Fig. 18: The S-CTRNN used in [72] with two parameter modifications. Adapted from [72]
such that networks with K 6= 0 over- or underestimate noisy variations in the
signal. Unlike its usage in [71], this manipulation is not performed after training,
but already during the training process, to account for the developmental nature
of ASD.
After training, the network’s behavior is evaluated by the network’s ability
to produce the trained trajectories. The internal representations are evalu-
ated by collecting the activations of the context layer neurons during the time
course of generation. The principle components of this high-dimensional space
(time steps×number of context neurons) indicated that networks tend to reuse
internal representation structure for patterns located at the same position in in-
put space. Thus, the authors define “good” internal network representations as
representations which reflect these characteristics of the input data and demon-
strated that internal representation quality and behavioral performance do not
always correspond. Fig. 19(b) shows an example how task performance (top)
and internal representation quality (bottom) change depending on the external
contribution parameter. The best internal representation quality is achieved
with χ = 0.5, as the internal representation is well structured, although χ = 1
shows more accurate behavioral performance. These qualitative observations
were also quantitatively verified in the high-dimensional space of neurons.
Performance, thus, does not always reflect internal representation quality.
Interestingly, for the parameter χ, both extremes lead to an ASD-like impair-
ment, as schematically depicted in Fig. 19(a). Typical development could cor-
respond to the middle. Whereas the right-hand side expresses high-functioning
ASD, the left-hand side describes ASD with severe impairments also at a be-
havioral level. A single parameter, thus, could account for the observed hetero-
geneity in the ASD population.
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(a) Hypothesis
internal representation
behavioral output
(b) Experimental results
Fig. 19: Effect of changing the external contribution parameter of the S-CTRNN from Fig. 18
on behavioral output (top) and on internal representation quality, evaluated in the two-
dimenisonal principal components space (bottom). Adapted from [72].
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5.6.3. Generalization ability in a variational Bayes recurrent neural network
In [76], a novel recurrent network type is introduced, the variational Bayes
predictive coding RNN (VBP-RNN). It differs from the S-CTRNN in that vari-
ance is not only coded on the output level, but also in the network’s context
neurons to enhance the network’s ability to represent uncertainty in the data.
We do not discuss it in detail here, as this study is not focused on modeling
ASD, but on representing deterministic vs. probabilistic behavior in an RNN in
a coherent way. The analogy to ASD is only an additional remark on the meta-
parameter W that performs a trade-off between two terms of the optimization
(loss) function. W switches between the typically minimized reconstruction er-
ror term (W = 0) and a regularization term that keeps the posterior distribution
of the latent variables (i.e. the context units) similar to its prior. If the network
is trained with W = 0, it develops deterministic dynamics and exhibits poor
generalization capabilities. Values of W > 0 lead to more randomness in the
network and improve generalization, but too high values result in a performance
drop.
W could therefore model the spectrum of ASD, where W = 0 is one extreme
where the network solely relies on its top-down intentionality and fails to gener-
alize, and too high values of W reflect performance impairment due to excessive
randomness in the network.
As this parameter controls how much regularization is performed, the ap-
proach is similar to [73] where regularization was intentionally impaired.
5.7. Other approaches
In 2000, O’Loughlin and Thagard [122] used a connectionist model to sim-
ulate weak coherence, and to demonstrate how a failure of maximizing global
coherence can cause deficits in theory of mind [117].
Their network model, a so-called constraint network, is hand-designed ac-
cording to the task and does not strictly fit an existing network category. The
network performs logical reasoning and consists of a set of neurons, each of
which corresponds to a logical element such as a belief (expressed as a sentence).
Connections between them are set as excitatory and inhibitory, depending on
whether two arguments support each other or are contradicting. Weights remain
fixed, but the activations of neurons get updated depending on the connections
to neighboring cells which can be excitatory (positive) on inhibitory (negative).
A decaying factor lets the network’s activation converge to a state after a certain
amount of time. Positive activations are then interpreted as an acceptance of
this belief, negative activations as a denial.
The authors show that a high level of inhibition, compared to ex-
citation, causes early activated association nodes in the network to suppress
concurring hypotheses. The network, therefore, prefers more direct solutions,
and makes wrong predictions. The overall coherence of the network, defined as
the satisfaction of most constraints in the complete network, is not optimized,
which can be considered as weak coherence.
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6. Conclusion and future directions
Artificial neural network models of SZ and ASD have been presented as a
great tool to fill the gap between theoretical models and biological evidence.
Early works were biased by technical restrictions, but recent models are able to
capture the same complexity as more conceptual methods like Bayesian models.
However, there are still restrictions to fully address heterogeneity and non-
specificity challenges of these two psychiatric disorders. Overlap between SZ
and ASD (and also other mental disorders), in particular, is present regard-
ing biological evidence. Therefore, it could be beneficial to use computational
models to explore the possible consequences of specific biological impairments in
general. In fact, some of the models discussed in this review could be considered
as models that are not specific to a certain disorder and could be applicable to
replicate a variety of different symptoms depending on the exact implementa-
tion and setup of the task. Overarching studies for connecting ideas and results
across different contexts (ASD, SZ or even other mental disorders) are clearly
missing to date and should be considered more strongly in the future.
Computational models of SZ and ASD should be inspired by neurobiological
evidence and coherently connect with observed behavior. Instead of focusing a
single symptom, models are required for explaining the co-occurrence of multi-
ple symptoms and suggesting reasons for symptom diversity and heterogeneity
among subjects. Furthermore, especially for ASD, the developmental nature of
the disorder should be taken more strongly into account.
6.1. Developmental factors
Developmental factors are especially relevant for ASD as a developmental
disorder. However, they can also be interesting for SZ, in particular to explain
why many cases of SZ emerge during adolescence and early adulthood [46, 82, 83]
and to investigate developmental factors which might contribute to the onset
of SZ [156]. Current models only partially take the developmental process into
account and focus more on modeling existing deficits in adult subjects with ASD.
For instance, existing models assume an aberrant number of neurons [75, 125] or
differences in the neural connections [146, 49] during the development, or they
change the way that learning proceeds by altering network regularization [73, 76]
or how information are integrated during learning [72]. However, these studies
still cannot answer the question of which initial causes promote the appearance
of ASD during the development. It might be beneficial to take even one step
more back in development, to the development of the human fetus. For instance,
a recent study [34] suggests that disordered intrauterine embodied interaction
during fetal period is a possible factor for neuro-developmental disorders like
ASD.
Developmental factors also appear to be important as they might shed light
on the remarkable heterogeneity among individuals with these disorders. In-
dividual differences might be caused by genetic as well as environmental fac-
tors. Taking development into account, thus, is crucial for gaining a better
understanding about the factors that lead to these disorders. An initial study
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targeting at explaining the heterogeneity of symptoms in different subjects is
[72]. They show that ASD might be explained as a continuous spectrum of a
single parameter as it has already been suggested previously in [59]. Different
parameter values during development could cause individual differences in the
emerged internal representations of a neural network which are not always ob-
servable at a behavioral level. Internal representation quality could be related to
the network’s generalization capabilities and these invisible deficits could, thus,
account for heterogeneous findings in behavioral studies. This work is, however,
still too abstract and does not directly translate to how task behavior in ASD
studies would be affected by such parameter changes.
For SZ, cortical pruning has been implemented in [43, 44] as an attempt to
account for differences in development. However, in all other discussed studies
of SZ developmental factors are not considered and could be certainly useful in
the future.
6.2. SZ and ASD as disorders of the self
One of the aspects not properly addressed in computational modeling, nei-
ther for SZ nor for ASD, is how diagnosed individuals experience their body
and self in comparison with control subjects. Unlike ASD, SZ has been consid-
ered as a disorder related to self. Recently, Noel and colleagues [157] and other
researchers are discussing body perception factors in both ASD and SZ indi-
viduals. Experiments on peripersonal space in body illusions show “opposite”
results: Whereas individuals with SZ are more prone to have body illusions
[158], individuals with ASD show a reduced illusionary effect [159]. Hence, the
causes of these psychopathologies have a direct impact on the perception of our
body and the self. In the case of patients diagnosed with SZ, this relation has
been more intensively studied [160] and some treatments include embodiment
therapies. Hence, NN models of the bodily or sensorimotor self [161] that are
able to explain body illusions [115] would help to validate the hypothesis in a
common framework. In fact, the body experience spectrum could make several
psychopathologies comparable and trigger new treatments directions.
6.3. Addressing multifinality and equifinality with sensorimotor integration ANN
models
On one hand, from the computational modeling point, the non-specificity of
these disorders where a single biological cause could result in different atypical-
ities is an advantage. According to the majority of the computational models
discussed in this manuscript, SZ and ASD are presented as disorders of sensory
information fusion or interpretation. Thus, general ANN sensorimotor inte-
gration models are an interesting departing point for studying these types of
psychopathologies. In particular, ANN models that are able to fit human-like
data (control and patients) in different experimental paradigms such as body
perceptual tests or decision making tasks.
On the other hand, different models could yield to a similar symptom. Hence,
ANN architectures developed for other perceptual syndromes should be system-
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atically studied as the model for other psychopathologies. For instance, Deep-
Boltzmann machine hallucinations models [77, 78] might be studied in a wider
framework including schizophrenic positive symptoms.
6.4. ANN for psychopathologies
In terms of neural network architectures, there is a further need of trans-
ferring the knowledge from state-of-the-art recurrent neural networks and deep
learning to neurological disorders as it was performed, for instance, with the
Neocognitron model of ASD [59] or the MTRNN model of SZ [47]. Theoretical
ANN studies, Computational Psychiatry and Neurosciences should be always
be in contact to boost the feedback of those disciplines.
In opposition to Bayesian models that lie on a high abstraction of the task,
modern ANN approaches [15] are able to cope with real sensor data such as vi-
sual information. For instance, cross-modal learning architectures combined
with hierarchical representation learning provide an interesting follow-up to
early ANN studies on SZ and ASD. Furthermore, ANN models of Bayesian
brain such as predictive coding [113] and circular inference are a basis for unit-
ing both communities. In fact, recent advances in probabilistic NNs like Vari-
ational Autoencoders [162] and Variational-RNN [163, 76], have provided the
mathematical framework to deploy ANN versions of prominent plausible models
of the brain such as the free-energy principle [164].
Finally, we presented some works that employ robotics systems’ validation
as a useful servant for the behaviour unit/level of analysis [47]. The interesting
aspect of these approaches is that the internal mechanism of the behaviour
comes to light [23]. Thus, further models might be supported with experimental
machine learning and robotics closing the gap between data models and real
world embodied models.
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